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Uniform Commercial Code-Estoppel-Forged Indorsements
1
In a recent New Jersey decision, Gast v. American Casualty Co.,
the court had to decide the extent to which the estoppel provisions of
the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE' precluded recovery of a check paid
over a forged indorsement. Under a standard clause in a real estate contract, the buyer, Hanna, was required to carry fire insurance. Upon
loss, the moneys jointly receivable by seller and buyer were to be put
in escrow by the seller's attorney; the buyer was to order the necessary
repairs; and the seller's attorney was to pay for them out of the escrow
funds.' In settlement of a fire claim, the insurance company drew a draft
upon itself,4 jointly payable to the seller, Gast, the buyer, Hanna, and
the public adjuster involved.5 Having obtained the adjuster's indorsement, the seller's attorney mailed the draft to the buyer's attorney with
instructions to obtain the buyer's indorsement, then return it for deposit
in the escrow account." Apparently the buyers, upon gaining possession
of the draft, forged the indorsement of the sellers, cashed the check,
and absconded. Shortly thereafter the sellers were advised by the buyer's
attorney that he had not heard from his clients and no longer considered
himself representing them. 7 The sellers, however, waited for more than
a month" to notify the insurance company of this irregularity and to
199 N.J. Super. 538, 240 A.2d 682 (Super. Ct. 1968).
2
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-406 [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.].

'Exhibit DA-8, Brief for Respondent at 12a, Gast v. American Cas. Co., 99
N.J. Super. 538, 240 A.2d 682 (Super Ct. 1968).
'The draft stated that it was "payable through the Berks County Trust Co.,
Reading Pa., upon acceptance by American Casualty Company," making the
insurance company both drawer and drawee. The bank involved was merely a
collecting bank. That the bank was not a drawee is made clear by U.C.C.
§ 3-120, which provides:
An instrument which states that it is "payable through" a bank or the
like designates that bank as a collecting bank to make presentment but
does not of itself authorize the bank to pay the instrument.
The draft was made payable to three persons, thus requiring multiple indorsement, to insure discharge of multiple claims. It is somewhat inconsistent, therefore, for the insurance company to later assert payment of plaintiff's claim by
reason of draft made out to multiple payees, for had the draft been made out
only to the Gasts, the forgery would probably never have occurred.
'Brief for Respondent, note 3 supra, at Exhibit DA-8.
' Brief for Respondent, note 3 supra, Exhibit DA-7 at 12.
' Had plaintiff been a merchant fully cognizant of the provisions of the T.C.C.,
his delay in notification of the insurance company would have had more serious
consequences than were levied by the court. See U.C.C. §§ 2-602(1), 1-204(2),

(3).
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request cancellation of the draft.' The notice was too late, for the insurance company had already accepted the draft and paid it. In a
contract action by the sellers on the fire insurance policy,'" the court
held the insurance company liable for conversion of the draft," and the
sellers free from any negligence within the meaning of the New Jersey
-2
Statute.
Negligence is usually not a defense to a contract action; one either
performs a contract or not, and the method itself makes no difference
The defense has been allowed, however,
to the fact of performance.'
when the negligence is offensive to a rational sense of justice and fair
play. The U.C.C. seems to adopt this position, providing:
Any person who by his negligence substantially contributes to a material alteration of the instrument or to the making of an unauthorized
signature is precluded from asserting the alteration or lack of authority
against a holder in due course or against a drawee or other payor
who pays the instrument in good faith and in accordance with the
14
reasonable commercial standards of the drawee's or payor's business.
Yet neither the U.C.C. nor most of the courts that have considered
this problem'" provide a clear definition of the phrase "substantially contributes." 6 The court in Gast attempted to resolve the problem by adopting a definition offered by the Oregon court in Gresham State Bank v.
0 & K Construction Co. :17
' Brief for Respondent, note 3 supra, Exhibit DA-5 at 8a. This delay from
May 10 to June 21 is the basis of defendant's charge of negligence.
10 The contract action was against the insurance company on the policy rather
than one against the bank because:
(a) If action is brought first against the bank, plaintiff will probably lose his
rights against the insurance company.
(b) Bringing action against the bank would increase discovery problems.
(c) If action is brought first against the bank, the bank might lose some of
its defenses, which it could have asserted against the insurance company. For a
discussion of this problem, see Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp. v. First Nat'l
Bank
1 & Trust, 345 Mass. 1, 184 N.E.2d 358 (1962).
N.J. REv. STAT. § 12A: 3-419 (1962). In effect this section imposes absolute
liability for conversion, subject only to certain U.C.C. defenses.
22 N.J. REv. STAT. § 12A: 3-406 (1962).
1
1A possible exception is the contract doctrine of substantial performance,
where the method of performance may bear upon the decision.
"IU.C.C. § 3-406.
"0See, e.g., Park State Bank v. Arena Auto Auction, Inc., 59 Ill. App. 2d
235, 207 N.E.2d 158 (1965); Jackson v. First Natl Bank, 55 Tenn. App. 545,
4031 S.W.2d 109 (1966).
1REPORT OF THE NEW YoRK LAW REV. COMM'N FOR 1955: STUDY OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 247 (1955) [hereinafter cited as 1955 REPORT].
17231 Ore. 106, 370 P.2d 726 (1962).
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[T]he requirement that the negligence 'substantially contributes' to
the making of the unauthorized signature is necessary to satisfy the
test of factual causation; it is the equivalent of the 'substantial factor'
test applied in the law of negligence generally.'
If the above definition is used in conjunction with the statute, a twofold
method of determining whether the defense of estoppel is available
emerges.' 9 The one against whom the estoppel is sought must have:
(1) been negligent and (2) that negligence must have been a "substantial
factor" in contributing to the forgery.2"
The statute omits the usual third step of proximate cause analysis-a
policy limitation on liability determined by the court. The omission raises
at least two implications: that proximate cause analysis is to be assumed
and used if necessary, or that proximate cause analysis is not necessary
in the cases that will foreseeably arise under Section 3-406. The latter
seems more logical, although it does not appear to be supported by any
declared statement of intent by the draftsmen of the U.C.C., nor specifically recognized by any court considering the question.2 '
As a general rule, for conduct to be negligent it has to be foreseeable
that the conduct involved will create an "unreasonable risk of causing
damage to others."' In addition, the risk involved has to be one to the
particular class or individual injured, not merely one to the community
generally.2- The question of foreseeability on a proximate cause level, in
contrast to that on the negligence level, "means a foreseeability much
more closely identified with the particular plaintiff or the class of which he
is a member and the interest of the plaintiff which is actually invaded. '24
To a large extent, therefore, foreseeability analysis on a proximate
cause level is a refinement of that conducted on the negligence level.
Yet, in the restricted situation usually encountered with Section 3-406,
is such a policy limitation on liability needed at all? For instance, in the
Gresham case, where a principal gave his agent the appearance of author8
Id.
19

at 120, 370 P.2d at 732.
The test has an additional step; the party seeking to use the estoppel
must have paid the instrument "in good faith and in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards" of its business. U.C.C. § 3-406.
so Id.
2" Only five courts appear to have considered the question in any depth, and
of these, only two have defined the term.
2 W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTS § 31, at 149 (3d ed. 1964).
2
For the initial analysis of "negligence in the air," see Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 334, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
2 Campbell, Duty, Fault, and Legal Cause, 1938 Wis. L. R1v. 402, 408-09.
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ity2l to cash checks, when actually no such authority existed,2 the risk
was clearly that the agent would convert the checks to his own use. The
only way to accomplish the conversion is by a forged indorsement, and
the checks must be paid or purchased by some party convinced of the
agent's authority. In other words, the possible methods of accomplishing the conversion are extremely limited. If those methods are inherent
in the act and can be clearly ascertained by the two-step negligence analysis, of what use is a proximate cause step?
Even though the statute may simplify the analytical steps needed to
reach a conclusion of negligence and estoppel, the problem remains, for
what type of negligence will the actor be liable? The Official Comment
to Section 3-4067 points out that the statute "adopts the doctrine of
Young v. Grote, 4 Bing 253 (1827), which held that a drawer who so
negligently draws an instrument as to facilitate its material alteration is
'2 8
liable to the drawee who pays the altered instrument in good faith.
In Young, a businessman, leaving London on a trip, left five signed
drafts, drawn on his bank, with his wife, who knew nothing about his
business. Her instructions were to use the drafts as was necessary. In
the course of business it became necessary to use a draft and the wife
instructed her husband's agent to fill in the proper sum on the draft.
The agent did so, but left obvious spaces where alterations could be
made. The agent showed the draft to the wife, who apparently approved
it. The agent then altered the draft, cashed it, and absconded.2 9 The
arbitrator charged Young with "gross negligence" 30 for giving the agent
the opportunity to alter the draft."1 The majority of the court on appeal
agreed with the judgment of the arbitrator, one of the justices calling
the negligence of Young "great." 2 The inference of Young and Comment One,33 therefore, is that simple or ordinary negligence will not raise
the defense of estoppel under Section 3-406.
In both Gresham and Gast, however, the court took a softer line than
The negligence of the principal consisted of giving his agent the appearance
of the authority in spite of the absence of it.
20 231 Ore. at 109, 370 P.2d at 728.
1,U.C.C. § 3-406, Comment 1.
25

28 Id.

"Young v. Grote, 4 Bing 253, 254, 255 (1827).
Id.at 256.
" Note here the application of the negligence-estoppel concept to contract law.
" 4 Bing at 260.
2

83U.C.C.

§ 3-406, Comment 1 further states: "It should be noted that the

rule as stated in this section requires that the negligence 'substantially' contribute
to the alteration."
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did Young or the Official Comment, by adopting the "substantial factor"
formula propounded in Anderson v. Minneapolis, Saint Paul & Sou Saint
Marie Railroad34 by the Minnesota court. The formula, as Prosser notes,
is closely related to the old "but for" rule, while being "clearly an improvement"3 5 over it. Even granting the improvement, in the majority
of cases the rule means little more than "the defendant's conduct is not
0
a cause of the event, if the event would have occurred without it.""
The language of the formula indicates that the conduct necessary to
qualify as a cause of an event does not have to be the dominant cause,
it must merely be a cause without which the event would not have
happened.
It appears that the reasoning of the Gast and Gresham courts is in
conflict with that of the statute. The language of the statute and the
Official Comment would not qualify all negligent conduct as estoppable
under the statute, but only conduct that was more than simply negligent
and that was a major cause of the event.8 7 The language adopted by the
two courts in question seems to let the statutory estoppel fall on any
negligent conduct that was an actual cause of the result complained of.
Although the court in Gast varies from the Comment and Young, the
more practical method of determining the cause in fact issue seems to
be the substantial factor test. To decide whether one cause contributed
more to an event than another results in the loss of the objectivity that
should necessarily be present in the determination of the cause in fact
issue.3 8 The same applies in determining whether one sort of negligence
is of a higher degree than another.3 Moreover, in a study of the U.C.C.
and its possible effect on New York law, the New York Law Revision
Commission approved the comment that "[T]he Code Section [3-406]
" 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 (1920). The rule is that "defendant's conduct
is a cause of the event if it was a material element and a substantial factor in
bringing it about"
" W. PROssER, LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 244 (3d ed. 1964).
" Id. at 242. The quoted material explains the "sine qua non" or "but for"
rule, which Prosser indicates tended to break down in certain limited fact situations. The "substantial factor" test was adopted by the Minnesota court to cover
one of these. Except for these particular cases, the operation of the "substantial
factor" formula is basically the same as the "but for" test.
' This conclusion is drawn from the language of Young and U.C.C. § 3-406,
Comment 1.
" See generally Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60
MicH. L. REv. 543 (1962).
" For an example of the confusion that can occur in trying to determine
degrees of negligence, note the problems the courts have run into in trying to
apply degrees of negligence to the guest passenger area. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF
ToRTs § 34, at 186 (3d ed. 1964).
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would substitute a principle of complete estoppel by negligence.... The
negligent person is made fully liable and can only pursue the wrongdoer."40 This statement may represent a change in the original position of
the writers of the U.C.C. If so, the position of the court in Gast is not
only judicially sound, but is in line with the "intent" of the framers
of the statute.
Section 3-406 thus presents a two-fold problem of statutory interpretation in deciding whether the section cuts off proximate cause analysis and in interpreting the meaning of "substantially contributes"-is it
a test of factual causation, or does it modify "negligence" and call for
"substantial" and not "simple" negligence for estoppel. The court did
not reach the proximate cause issue, but it was not faced with a set of
facts that called for its resolution. The negligence issue was properly
solved and further analysis, which would have contributed little to the
decision of the case, was suspended. In addition the court seems to have
correctly resolved the "substantial-simple" negligence conflict, in favor of
the substantial factor test.

H. IRwiN COFFIELD, III
,o 1955 REPORT at 248.

